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SYMPOSIUM
THE FEDERALIST CONSTITUTION
FOREWORD
David S. Schwartz,* Jonathan Gienapp,** John Mikhail*** & Richard
Primus****
Over the past twenty years, constitutional law has taken a decidedly
historical turn, both in academia and in the courts. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
constitutional decisions are increasingly filled with extended historical
inquiries, and not just by self-described originalists.1 Yet much of this
historical inquiry is severely distorted. Twenty-first-century lawyers and
judges enjoy improved and ever-widening access to a rich array of primary
sources from the founding era and the early republic, but the ability of
modern interpreters to make sense of these materials is pervasively affected
by present biases. Many of these biases stem directly from long-standing
received narratives of constitutional meaning. Every generation of
constitutional interpreters since 1787 has indulged to some extent in the
American penchant for linking present-day intuitions to the minds of the
founders.2 This does not necessarily make us “all originalists now,”3 but it
* Foley & Lardner Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School.
** Assistant Professor of History, Stanford University.
*** Carroll Professor of Jurisprudence, Georgetown University Law Center.
**** Theodore J. St. Antoine Collegiate Professor of Law, The University of Michigan Law

School.

1. Compare, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573–636 (Scalia, J.)
(examining the original historical understanding of the Second Amendment), with id. at 636–
80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same).
2. See Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1703
(2012) (“Attention to original intentions and expectations facilitates judges’ guardianship of
long-term values, helps to constitute us as a people with temporally extended commitments,
and lends the Framers’ credibility to the results reached through an otherwise legitimacychallenged system of judge-made constitutional law.”); Richard Primus, Why Enumeration
Matters, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13, 20 (2016) (certain constitutional interpretations are
“continuity tenders” that ritually “affirm a connection to one’s predecessors”).
3. ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 1 (2011) (“We are all originalists now.”); The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010) (statement of Solicitor General Elena Kagan) (“[W]e
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does tend to make every generation’s interpretive narrative—whether from
James Madison in 1830,4 Roger Taney in 1857,5 Robert Jackson in 1942,6 or
Clarence Thomas in our own day7—into an origin myth.
A challenge for historical understanding of the founding is that the
dominant origin myth has been shaped so deeply by political developments
more than a decade following ratification of the Constitution. The electoral
dominance of the Jeffersonian-Republican and Jacksonian-Democratic
political parties between 1800 and 1860 rewrote the founding narrative in
ways that even today remain to be disentangled. For the century following
Chief Justice John Marshall’s death in 1835, the Supreme Court would be
dominated by Jeffersonian-Jacksonian Justices or by Justices whose
constitutional worldview was shaped in no small measure by JeffersonianJacksonian jurisprudence. Even today, it is difficult to avoid reading
founding-era evidence through that distorting prism. As a result, ideas like
“dual sovereignty” and “limited enumerated powers” that were contested in
the founding era and only “settled” by post-1800 constitutional politics are
mistaken for the Constitution’s consensus “original meaning.” The
ideologies of once powerful cohorts can become unfamiliar or even lost after
the landscape of power shifts. This was largely true of the Federalists.
We come to unbury the Federalists, not to praise them. Not that they are
unworthy of praise: many ideas promoted by the founding-era Federalists
were sensible, intelligent, or even wise. They also had shortcomings. Our
present aim, however, is neither to censure the Federalists nor to argue that
they were superior to the Jeffersonians and Jacksonians who followed them.
Instead, our intention in gathering a distinguished group of constitutional
historians is to make progress in excavating the lost civilization of the
Federalists, whose constitutional ideology predominated before 1800 but
faded thereafter. This Symposium does not claim to initiate this historical
inquiry. But by giving a name to the constellation of ideas and practices we
study—“the Federalist Constitution”—we hope to encourage increased
interest and coherence in the enterprise of presenting a historically accurate
picture of the founding.
The essays that follow do not purport to show that the original meaning of
the Constitution cleanly reflected a Federalist agenda. Rather, they
apply what [the Framers] say, what they meant to do. So in that sense, we are all
originalists.”).
4. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in 9 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 411, 417 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (emphasizing fundamental continuities
between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution).
5. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 422–23 (1857) (inferring the original
proslavery intent of the Framers based on later antebellum demands of slave states),
superseded by constiutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
6. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (“At the beginning Chief Justice
Marshall described the Federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded.”).
7. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 590 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The
Founding Fathers confirmed that most areas of life . . . would remain outside the reach of the
Federal Government.”).
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demonstrate that the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the ratification
debates, and the precedents of the early republic together produced a
Constitution that combined Federalist with Anti-Federalist elements and left
considerable room for further contestation. One simply cannot make sense
of the original Constitution without reckoning with the Federalist ideas that
originally surrounded it. The present-day significance of this historical
inquiry is to highlight problems with thinking that the Constitution’s
contested provisions had singular “original meanings” and to reinforce the
proposition that a political settlement of constitutional meaning reached
decades after ratification cannot “fix” original meaning retroactively.8
Indeed, the story that emerges strongly suggests that the range of
constitutional meanings available in one generation can be altered by a later
one—both as a descriptive and a normative matter.
What do we mean by “the Federalist Constitution”? Roughly, we mean a
vision of the Constitution held between 1787 and 1800 by leading figures in
the struggle for constitutional ratification and, thereafter, by leading figures
in the Federalist Party—a group that dominated the Constitution’s formative
years. Needless to say, those individuals did not agree on all points all the
time, and we accordingly do not suggest that the Federalist Constitution, as
we use the term, was a comprehensive theory or a crisply formulated dogma.
Instead, we conceive of the Federalist Constitution as a cluster concept with
many features, most or all of which were embraced by many leading
Federalists.9 Those features include but are not limited to:
 an operative preamble, signifying more than mere throat clearing;
 broad legislative power to address all national problems;
 complete and inherent foreign affairs powers;
 exclusive national direction of relations with Indian tribes;
 an implied power to regulate the domestic interstate slave trade and
possibly even to abolish slavery throughout the United States;
 other inherent and implied national and corporate powers, together with
sweeping legislative authority to carry them into execution;
 prohibition of both criminal and civil ex post facto laws;
 state suability and broad equitable powers of the federal courts;
 federal common law, including a federal common law of crimes; and
 above all, the recognition that the United States was a nation and
therefore, that the government of the United States was a genuine
national government possessing the inherent powers of national
governments, including the powers to provide for the common defense,

8. See generally JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018).
9. That some of these features were disavowed by some leading Federalists during the
ratification debates or opposed by some leading Federalists (or former Federalists) during
postratification politics does not mean that those features were not affirmatively embraced by
many or most Federalists at the relevant times.
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promote the general welfare, and fulfill all of the other ends for which
that government was formed.
***
The essays that follow fall roughly into three topical groups. One set deals
with the interpretive implications of excavating the Federalist Constitution.
Jonathan Gienapp leads off the Symposium with “In Search of Nationhood
at the Founding.”10 Gienapp argues that anachronistic analysis of foundingera social contract thinking has unduly emphasized a conflictual relationship
between government and liberty and thus missed the ways in which
Federalists harnessed social contract theory to justify expansive
governmental authority.11 They did so by identifying the United States as a
genuine nation, representing a national compact of individuals, and whose
government, accordingly, was equipped with the broad power to act on behalf
of this national people. Richard Primus, in “Reframing Article I, Section 8,”
develops a significant interpretive consequence of that Federalist approach
to nationhood.12 Primus argues that the Constitution’s enumeration of
congressional powers is best understood as a “means of empowerment, rather
than limitation,” once we perceive the problems with the conventional
narratives of “limited enumerated powers”—particularly that a limiting
enumeration was not well matched to the kinds of limits the Framers wanted
to impose on a national government.13
The next pair of essays shows room for divergence within the broad
agreement over the Federalist Constitution framework—in this case,
different views of James Madison’s contribution to the Federalist
Constitution. In “President Madison’s Living Constitution: Fixation,
Liquidation, and Constitutional Politics in the Jeffersonian Era,” Saul Cornell
argues that, contrary to originalists who have claimed Madison as their own,
modern originalism, particularly public meaning originalism, is far closer in
spirit to the Anti-Federalist and “Old Republican” critics who challenged
Madison.14 Rather than embrace a strongly textualist approach to
constitutional interpretation centered on modern originalist ideas of fixation
and constraint, Madison sought a more holistic approach to constitutional
interpretation, one that acknowledged the centrality of constitutional
politics.15 David S. Schwartz and John Mikhail, in “The Other Madison
Problem,” question the assumed primacy of Madison’s thought in the
framing of the Constitution.16 They argue that Madison was neither the
10. Jonathan Gienapp, In Search of Nationhood at the Founding, 89 FORDHAM L. REV.
1783 (2021).
11. Id. at 1789.
12. Richard Primus, Reframing Article I, Section 8, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2003 (2021).
13. Id. at 2005.
14. Saul Cornell, President Madison’s Living Constitution: Fixation, Liquidation, and
Constitutional Politics in the Jeffersonian Era, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761 (2021).
15. Id. at 1778.
16. David S. Schwartz & John Mikhail, The Other Madison Problem, 89 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2033 (2021).
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“father of the Constitution” nor its leading theorist, as his proposals at the
Philadelphia Convention were aimed at controlling state governments rather
than on empowering the national government to regulate the people
directly.17
The second set of essays develops the idea that understanding the founding
requires attention to the place of the newly formed United States in the
Atlantic and greater North American world, ringed by Native nations and the
ongoing colonial incursions of European powers. So viewed, the new
Constitution created what some scholars refer to as a “fiscal-military state”
and which leading Americans preferred to style the “empire for liberty,” with
aspirations to expand across the continent at the expense of these other
nations. In “The Federalist Constitution as a Project in International Law,”
David Golove and Daniel Hulsebosch bridge this theme with the first group
of essays. They identify three dimensions of the law of nations that the
founders used to pursue their constitutional project: the first dimension was
the law of nations’ strictly international aspects, akin to modern public
international law; the second was its rich body of resources, featured in a
robust transnational dialogue, that was supposed to guide the design and
governance of a “civilized” federal state, akin to modern comparative
constitutional law; and the third was its transnational dimension as a body of
natural law principles and common usages that helped coordinate crossborder relations among the states and their citizens, as well as between them
and foreigners. According to Golove and Hulsebosch, it is impossible to
understand the Constitution without an appreciation of these still unfamiliar
premises of the founding generation’s state-building project.18 Gregory
Ablavsky likewise connects the themes of these first two sets of essays in
“Two Federalist Constitutions of Empire.”19 Focusing on the new republic’s
efforts to mediate between U.S. citizens and Native peoples, Ablavsky
explores the tension between the Federalist “constitution of constraint” that
used federal power to discipline an unruly, expansionist citizenry and the
equally Federalist “constitution of empowerment” that directed national
power outward.20 In the end, he suggests, empowerment prevailed largely
because Federalists failed to anticipate how adept the nation’s citizens would
be at exploiting federal power for their own purposes.21 Mary Bilder, in
“Without Doors: Native Nations and the Convention,” brings to light a
virtually forgotten narrative of Native nations’ presence and diplomatic
efforts in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 to confirm treaty obligations

17. Id. at 2036–37.
18. David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Federalist Constitution as a Project
of International Law, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1841 (2021).
19. Gregory Ablavsky, Two Federalist Constitutions of Empire, 89 FORDHAM L. REV.
1677 (2021).
20. Id. at 1678.
21. Id. at 1700.
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in the new Constitution and bar state claims of authority.22 Bilder argues that
these efforts were largely, if temporarily, successful despite the misleading
absence of express language in the Constitution’s text and that the framing
generation “without doors” also participated in creating the Constitution. 23
In “Slavery’s Constitution: Rethinking the Federal Consensus,” Maeve
Glass sheds new light on the so-called “federal consensus,” in which implied
powers under the new Constitution were seemingly required to be interpreted
not to extend to slavery. Glass argues that this doctrine was an extension of
a preconstitutional doctrine of “noninterference” with mutually profitable
commercial relationships between Southern slaveowning planters and
merchants and their Northern correspondents and business partners.24 Yet as
James E. Pfander and Elena Joffroy argue in “Equal Footing and the States
‘Now Existing’: Slavery and State Equality over Time,” antislavery
Federalists had successfully “secured constitutional provisions that
empowered Congress to foreclose much interstate and foreign traffic in
enslaved persons to confine slavery to the states ‘now existing.’”25 This
original intention would be overruled in subsequent years by the political
triumph of the “federal consensus.”26 In an essay on a closely related theme,
“The Unwritten Constitution for Admitting States,” Roderick M. Hills Jr.
argues that the original Federalist constitutional template for admitting new
states under Article IV, Section 3 gave Congress broad power to govern new
territory as colonies of the original states, in the hope of controlling unruly
settlers.27 Eventually, however, this original understanding was supplanted
by a popular sovereignty theory of admitting new states on an “equal
footing,” offering a demonstration that durable constitutional rules are
grounded in “cross-partisan constitutional conventions,” rather than text or
original meaning.28
The third set of essays explores the themes of the Federalist Constitution
in Articles II and III. In “Executive Power and the Rule of Law in the
Marshall Court: A Rereading of Little v. Barreme and Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy,” Jane Manners argues that scholars have anachronistically
misread the Federalist balance of war power between the executive and
Congress.29 Reexamining two important 1804 Marshall Court precedents,
22. Mary Sarah Bilder, Without Doors: Native Nations and the Convention, 89 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1707 (2021).
23. Id. at 1709–10.
24. Maeve Glass, Slavery’s Constitution: Rethinking the Federal Consensus, 89
FORDHAM L. REV. 1815 (2021).
25. James E. Pfander & Elena Joffroy, Equal Footing and the States “Now Existing”:
Slavery and State Equality over Time, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975, 1978 (2021).
26. Id.
27. Roderick M. Hills Jr., The Unwritten Constitution for Admitting States, 89 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1877 (2021).
28. Id. at 1877.
29. Jane Manners, Executive Power and the Rule of Law in the Marshall Court: A
Rereading of Little v. Barreme and Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 89 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1941 (2021).
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Manners recovers the forgotten understanding that the president could
neither advance the nation closer to war than Congress intended nor give
officers a right to act where Congress had not.30 Thomas H. Lee, in “Article
IX, Article III, and the First Congress: The Original Constitutional Plan for
the Federal Courts, 1787–1792,” argues that new federal judiciary’s key
mission was to mitigate favoritism for domestic litigants in order to
incentivize international trade and investment.31 This little known purpose,
Lee suggests, sheds new light on several disputed elements of federal judicial
power.32 Finally, in “Presidential Removal: The Marbury Problem and the
Madison Solutions,” Jed Handelsman Shugerman unpacks the mistaken
assumptions built into the belief that the Article II’s Vesting Clause mandates
the theory of a unitary executive, recently endorsed by the Supreme Court.33
Shugerman argues that faulty assumptions about the meaning of the Vesting
Clause represent a semantic and constitutional “drift” that is belied by
founding-era understandings.34
***
We hope that readers will find that these essays shed new light on enduring
questions about the Constitution and stimulate new and productive lines of
inquiry.

30. Id. at 1948–49.
31. Thomas H. Lee, Article IX, Article III, and the First Congress: The Original
Constitutional Plan for the Federal Courts, 1787–1792, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1895 (2021).
32. Id. at 1933–40.
33. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Presidential Removal: The Marbury Problem and the
Madison Solutions, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2085 (2021).
34. Id. at 2111.

